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This, however, is nit-picking. There are two more serious weaknesses. The 
fascinating narrative comes to an abrupt halt without a comparison of the Trent project 
with other canal-building projects and public works, or with the development of 
tourism or of hydro-power elsewhere in Canada. There is not even a recapitulation of 
themes. A more saftisfying conclusion would also inform the reader about what has 
happened to the Trent since 1920. The author writes: "Given the millions of dollars it 
has poured into the economy, to say nothing of the thousands of man-hours of pleasure 
it has given to its users, the canal is worth every cent the politicians reluctantly spent 
on it" ( 406). Readers outside Ontario may not understand this point at all. 
Although Prof. Angus is sensitive to the injustice of ethnic bigotry, he almost 
replicates the problem himself, because he cannot refrain from ethnic stereotyping. 
He implies that all Scots are "stubborn" (41), "tight-fisted" (145), "self-righteous" 
(146), "laconic" (174) and "frugal" (326). Nevertheless, he makes unexplained 
exceptions. For many years, the two operators of the Big Chute Marine Railway (one 
of them the author's father) were Scots. When Scotty and Jack are called "charming", 
"conscientious and dedicated", "friendly, co-operative ... helpful" and witty (395-396), 
apparently with none of the aforementioned weaknesses, credibility is strained. Ethnic 
stereotypes (when not actually insulting) are clumsy tools of description or analysis. 
Where "the rule" is applied, one suspects prejudice, just as much as when it is not 
applied and exceptions are made. 
These flaws aside, Prof. Angus' book, because of its lively style, attention to 
detail and narrative power, deserves to be in both university and public, as well as 
private, libraries. · 
*** 
Robert R. Taylor 
Brock University 
Peter Baskerville - The Bank of Upper Canada. Toronto: Champlain Society and 
Carleton University Press, 1987. Pp. clii, 397. 
Over the past few years, in the general expansion of interest in Canadian 
business history, several studies focusing upon the history of individual chartered 
banks have appeared. This reviewer, like others who have pursued the path of banking 
history, has concentrated largely upon banks which still exist, or, failing that, has 
chosen institutions which were absorbed by banks that still function. The historical 
records of ongoing institutions have usually been retained in corporate archives. 
Accordingly, by choosing to study the right bank, the researcher could put himself in 
a position to be able to examine such crucial documents as internal correspondence 
or the minutes of the meetings of directors. 
In this context, one has to give full credit to Peter Baskerville for having had the 
courage to take on the history of the Bank of Upper Canada. The first chartered bank 
in Ontario began its operations in 1822 before passing from the scene, in 1866, when 
its affairs were liquidated. Occasionally, the records of such liquidated banks have 
mysteriously made their way into archival collections. This possibility was precluded 
in the case of the Bank of Upper Canda when its papers were sold off to a paper 
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manufacturer in the 1870s at $20 per ton. As Baskerville notes, "Doubtless many 
private and public figures breathed a sigh of relief after the sale" (ix). 
He was able to pass such judgement on the basis of an exhaustive examination 
of the documents relating to the history of this bank that could be collected from a 
wide range of archival sources. This book employs those documents in two different 
ways. The bulk of the pages in this volume are taken up with the reproduction of the 
most important letters, reports and financial statements that Baskerville discovered. 
The history of the Bank of Upper Canada has always been shrouded in a certain 
mystery due to the destruction of its corporate records, but now, thanks to the 
publication of this material, documents relating to this institution are, ironically, more 
readily accessible to students of Canadian business history than those of any other 
bank. 
In addition to the reproduction of these documents, this volume also contains 
Baskerville's book-length discussion of the history of the bank. This discussion is 
modestly called an introduction to the documents, but in fact, it is a first-rate analysis 
of one of the major financial institutions of the pre-Confederation period. The author 
manages to overcome the problems created by the absence of corporate records 
largely because he is not interested in simply describing the history of the institution. 
Rather, Baskerville's goal is to deal with two major issues that have long interested 
Canadian economic historians. 
The first of these issues pertains to the relationship between business and 
government. This question is of particular relevance to the Bank of Upper Canada 
since it was widely denounced by William Lyon Mackenzie in the years leading up 
to the Rebellions of 1837 as the tool of the Family Compact. Baskerville convincingly 
shows that this claim was unfounded. The bank was not chartered as the government's 
financial agent, and nothing that occurred under the presidency of William Allan 
between 1822 and 1835 brought the bank any closer to the state. This situation began 
to change, however, under Allan's successors who aggressively sought increased 
government business for the bank, a strategy that ultimately resulted in the Bank of 
Upper Canada being made the official banker of the Province of Canada, in 1850. 
Unfortunately, as Baskerville shows, the securing of this position coincided with the 
involvement of the government in the financing of railway development. The bank 
overextended itself in aiding both the government and the railways, and when the 
economy went into a tailspin in the late 1850s, the bank's fortunes declined. Basker-
ville describes the bank as "moribund" by 1860 (cxxix), and efforts at its revival, 
including the virtual appointment of a new manager by the finance minister, could not 
preclude its closure in 1866. 
In charting the relationship of the bank with the state, Baskerville offers a 
number of useful insights. First, he carefully forces historians to rethink their simplis-
tic assumptions that businessmen and government officials formed part of an undif-
ferentiated elite which directed both political and economic affairs. Rather, 
Baskerville provides numerous examples of the difficulties inherent in the relation-
ship between the bank and the state, precisely because each had its own priorities. 
Moreover, the author provides an excellent analysis of exactly how the financial 
system worked, or did not work, during this period. More particularly, he shows how 
the government moved away from an informal, decentralized system for the trans-
action of its affairs to one with greater central control. In that earlier system, the bank 
would frequently be hurt when it provided advances to government departments for 
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expenditures that had not been approved by any central authority. In such a situation, 
the bank could be stuck holding the bag. By the 1860s, with the rise of a modem 
industrial economy, more formal means of accounting and bookkeeping were intro-
duced, but this also frequently worked against the interests of the bank. Just as it found 
itself in deep difficulty and in desperate need of the tolerance of the government, more 
efficient business practices justified the decision to drop it as the government's banker 
in 1864, a decision that led to its demise shortly thereafter. 
In addition to the issue of government-business relations, Baskerville also deals 
with the question of the role of the bank as an agent contributing to the emergence of 
an "industrial economy" (xci). While the bank, especially under Allan, committed 
itself to a tight-money policy oriented to the movement of staples, his successors were 
more adventurous, particularly in their deep involvement in mortgage lending and in 
the financing of railways. These practices were unwise since they tied up the assets of 
the bank for long periods of time with the result that depositors and other creditors 
could not easily be repaid. Baskerville does not clearly explain, however, how these 
lending practices were designed to contribute to industrial development. Railway 
ventures, for instance, were launched primarily for the movement of staples, and 
while they had a profound effect upon later industrial development, it is not clear that 
the bank's leaders were consciously promoting the transformation ofthe economy. In 
most cases, Baskerville does well in integrating his findings into the larger literature 
on the issue at hand. In this particular instance, however, he needed to clarify his 
interpretation by making direct reference to the studies touching upon the role of 
commercial and industrial capital in the transformation of the nineteenth-century 
Canadian economy. 
Regardless of the willingness of the bank to encourage the emergence of an 
industrial economy, it is hard to understand exactly why the bank's management 
chose during the 1840s and 1850s to support "general growth and structural change" 
since Baskerville shows that such policies worked against the stability of all Upper 
Canadian banks, the Bank of Upper Canada included (eli). Why did no one in the 
banking community come to the conclusion that pursuing a smaller and safer business 
was the wise course to follow? More particularly, why did the leaders ofthe Bank of 
Upper Canada not choose to follow a different course for their institution? 
Such quibbles are raised with considerable reluctance since the author was 
forced to labour under the inconvenience of lacking any of the internal documentation 
of the bank. In any event, these are minor issues that do not in any way detract from 
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If scholars no longer seriously doubt that the Counter-Reformation entailed 
something more than an effort to repress Protestantism, a clear scholarly consensus 
